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ABSTRACT: In this paper we disouss about dynamio programming 
models with a quadratio objeotive funotion. An extension is 
suggested to relax the hypothesis of symmetrio penalties. The 
extended model allows for a more aoourate modelling of prefe-
renoes. 
1. Introduction. 
Mitigating the economic cycle and its undesirable 
consequences has be en one of the main and more difficult goals 
of economic science. The complexity of this task is increased by 
two factors: 1) to implement an anticyclical policy, the decision 
maker must balance a variety of different and conflicting goals 
and 2) economic policies are usually affected by lags. 
Much of the post-World War 11 analysis of economic 
fluctuations has be en centred in modelling optimal policy maker I s 
decisions by· the optimization of a quadratic loss function 
subject to a set of constraints: 
where: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 ) 
Vector (nx1) of state variables at time t. 
Vector (nx1) of target values at time t. 
Vector (mx1) of control variables at time t. 
Symmetric semi-positive definite matrices (nxn) 
and (mxm). 
ft continuous and twice differentiable function 
defined from Rn+m to Rn . 
This family of models is quite popular because the 
problem is differentiable and, under standard assumptions first 
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order conditions are linear and second order conditions can be 
safely ignored. 
However, it has be en recognized that the standard 
quadratic criterion is often an inaccurate representation of most 
policy maker's preferences. Specifically, it assumes that the 
preferences about misachievements are symmetrical i. e., an under-
achievement in sorne goal is as harmful as an overachievement. 
This hypothesis is too restrictive in many practical situations. 
For example, let us suppose a macroeconomic analysis based in 
this modelo Thus, x t would include variables as inflation, GDP, 
unemployement. rate and so on. A standard specification for Ut 
would consider sorne measure of the quantity of money and public 
expenditure. syrnmetry implies that an underachievement in the GDP 
target, for example, is as undesirable as an overachievement. 
Obviously, this symmetry is an inaccurate approximation of most 
policy maker's preferences. 
An indirect solution to this flaw have be en suggested by 
Chow (1975) and Kendrick (1988). Friedman (1972) proposes the 
use of a piecewise quadratic loss function instead of (1) to get 
asymmetric penalties on deviations. This method, while correct 
and remarkably flexible, imposes unwieldy complexities on the 
optimization. 
At the same time, multiobjective problems have been 
analyzed in other branches of optimization theory. A fruitful 
example of this research line is Goal Prograrnming [Vid. Lee 
(1972) l. Goal prograrnming approaches these problems by minimizing 
deviations from a set of goals. These deviations are measured by 
means of 'soft constraints', that is, restrictions that could be 
violated at a certain costo 
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2. The soft aonstrained dynamia modelo 
using a 'soft constrained' model, it is easy to obtain an 
asymmetric penalization while keeping the problem in a linear or 
quadratic differentiable contexto Following this approach, the 
asymmetric penalties model can be formalized as: 
Min 
s.t. 
~ (dt ' A1t dt + di' A2t di ) + u t ' Bt Ut 
teT 
IIteT: Xt = ft(Xt_l,Ut_l) 
Xt + dt - d+ t = xd t 
+ dt , dt 
'" 
O 
Xo = ~o ' Uo = YO 
(4 ) 
(5 ) 
(6 ) 
(7 ) 
(8) 
where: 
dt: Underachievement at time t. 
di: Overachievement at time t. 
A1t , A2t : Symmetric and semi-positive definite matrices 
(nxn). 
Bt : Symmetric and semi-positive definite matrix 
(mxm) • 
The key of this formulation lies in Eqs. (6)-(7). Eq. (6) 
is a 'soft constraint' in which vectors di and dt aét as slack 
variables, allowing deviations from target at a certain (not 
necessarily symmetrical) costo The nonnegativity of the slacks, 
as expressed in (7), is necessary in order to distinguish between 
surplus and deficit deviations. 
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There are two simplifying hypothesis that may help to 
solve this model: 
separability: It consists in: 1) assume the linearity of the 
state equation and 2) impose separability of the loss function, 
so matrices Alt , A2t and Bt are diagonal. Thus, the problem 
collapses to a quadratic separable model and its solution can be 
computed by efficient L.P. techniques [See Wolfe (1959)] which 
offer substantial computational advantages over nonlinear 
methods. 
Dimensionality reduction: When only one kind of misachievement 
should be penalized, the definition of unnecessary slack 
variables can be avoided yielding a substantial reduction of 
problem size. For example, let 1 be the set of goals confronted 
by the decision maker. This set is fully covered by: 
lU Set of goals in which the underachievement of target 
values should be penalized. 
lO Set of goals in which the overachievement of target 
values should be penalized. 
If lu n lo = ¡2j, a more concise formulation of the 
asymmetrical problem can be stated using: 
IftET: lfiElu Xit + dit ;:: 
d 
Xit (9) 
lfiElo + d (10) Xit - d it ::; Xit 
instead of (6) • 
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3. An example on monetary control. 
We will assume that it is desired to implement an active 
and anticyclical monetary policy. This policy seeks to minimize 
the deviations of the monetary growth rate mt from an exogenously 
determined target path m~. In this circumstances, a policy 
optimization model with symmetric penalties is: 
T 
Min ¿; 
t=O 
T 
Min ¿; 
t=O 
This model implies that: 
1) The decision maker is sensitive to: 
- Deviations from the target path. 
(11) 
(12 ) 
- The smoothness of the policy. This idea is captured 
by the quadratic adjustment cost of mt. 
The trade-off between this two objectives is measured 
by the parameter Á, normalized in the simplex [0,1]. 
2) There is a stable trade-off (measured by a nonnegative 
rate of time discount r) between achieving the target 
in different instants. 
In the asymmetrical problem: 
1 ÁO 2 
(1+r)t { t + (l-Á) (mt - mt _1 )2 } (13) 
s.t. mt -
°t ~ m
d 
t (14 ) 
mO = IDO (15) 
°t ~ O (16) 
5 
· .. the loss function have been modified so that only nonnegative 
departures from target are taken into account. 
optimal solutions for both problems have been computed by 
Wolfe's method [See Wolfe (1959)] using A=.4, r=l%, IDO=10% and 
T=16. The target and optimal paths are shown in columns (e), (A) 
and (B) of table 1. 
t Symmetrical Asymmetrical Goal (A) (B) (e) (A) - (e) (B)-(e) 
1 8.37 6.36 2.91 5.46 3.45 
2 6.82 5.00 4.64 2.18 0.36 
3 5.28 3.86 5.00 0.28 -1.14 
4 3.93 2.72 4.14 -0.21 -1.42 
5 2.41 1.56 2.48 -0.07 -0.92 
6 0.83 0.39 0.53 0.30 -0.14 
7 -0.56 -0.79 -1.20 0.64 0.41 
8 -1.54 -1.71 -2.36 0.82 0.65 
9 -1.96 -2.20 -2.77 0.81 0.57 
10 -1.85 -2.31 -2.47 0.62 0.16 
11 -1.33 -2.30 -1.65 0.32 -0.65 
12 -0.58 -2.30 -0.59 0.01 -1.71 
13 0.18 -2.30 0.42 -0.24 -2.72 
14 0.78 -2.30 1.15 -0.37 -3.45 
15 1.14 -2.30 1.50 -0.36 -3.80 
16 1.26 -2.30 1.44 -0.18 -3.74 
Table 1: symmetrical vs. asymmetrical control results. 
Solution (A) may be formally optimal, but could never be 
satisfactory if preferences about misachievements are asyrnmetric. 
specifically, the path (A) tends to grow toward the goal path for 
t~10, while path (B) reaches a steady state. This equilibrium 
will be altered only if the target shifts under the optimal path, 
yielding overachievements once again. This effect is illustrated 
in fig. 1. 
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Fig 1: comparison between optimal paths. 
It can also be seen that path (B) is more effective 
because the surroundings of the target path are reached in t=2, 
while the symmetrical penalties path does not achieve a similar 
proximity up to t=3. 
7 
11111111 
5306533397 
4. Conclusions. 
We have shown that dynamic problems with asymmetric 
penalties can be easily formulated using multiobjective programm-
ing techniques so: 
a} The inaccurate modelling of asymmetric preferences is 
avoided. 
b} The model is kept in a linear or quadratic differen-
tiable contexto 
We have presented all the formulations in a deterministic 
framework in order to avoid unnecessary complexities. The 
stochastic extension of this technique is straightforward. 
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